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The European Commission’s recent decision 1 to require the use of international accounting standards
(IAS 2) for the preparation of the consolidated financial statements of listed companies is motivated
by the very understandable and justifiable desire to improve the comparability of financial
statements and achieve  a level playing field. However, it raises a number of issues of principle, and
some major practical difficulties.
Looking beyond technical implementation issues, central bankers are faced with two crucial questions
in terms of the maintenance of financial stability.
–  Are the standards sufficiently prudent in today’s climate of economic uncertainty and mistrust of
the markets, and will they address the shortcomings that have recently been revealed?
–  Is there not a risk of the standards introducing artificial volatility into financial statements,
impairing a proper understanding of the true position of economic agents?
This article looks at the main changes proposed by the IASB in the light of these two questions, and
in particular at changes which have a very significant impact on financial intermediaries, which oil
the wheels of every economy.
The changes in accounting for credit risk by credit institutions introduced by the revised IAS 39 3 are
undoubtedly an advance in conceptual terms: by requiring the earlier recognition of risk in the
accounts, they should reduce the cyclical nature (and hence the volatility) of the financial reporting
of credit risk. They are also an advance in terms of regulatory convergence, in that they are closer to
the prudential rules included in the new solvency ratio.
.../...
1 Regulation of the European Parliament of 19 July 2002.
2 Standards issued by the IASB (International Accounting Standards Board), wich was formed in 2001 as the successor body to the International
Accounting Standards Committee – IASC, also known as IFRS (International Financial Reporting Standards).
3 IAS 39 is the standard on financial instruments, and as such impacts the vast majority of banking activities.Banque de France • FSR • June 2003 133
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As regards the determination of corporate risk exposures and the criteria for derecognition – an
issue at the heart of recent accounting scandals – the IASB proposes a middle way between two
contrasting approaches. On the one hand there is the view that favours form over the economic
substance of risks; this has led some standard-setters to allow derecognitions that look excessive
given the actual risk exposure. Other standard-setters define the concept of risk in very broad terms,
prohibiting any transfer of assets and liabilities off balance sheet or any use of derecognition where
the “transferor” retains the risks or rewards (i.e. profits) of a transferred asset. These two extreme
positions lead to very different definitions of what should be in a balance sheet. The approach
recommended by the IASB is a compromise. Although it undoubtedly needs to be made more effective,
it does offer an interesting perspective.
However, the concept of fair value, a key element in the IASB framework, and the proposed
arrangements regarding risk management and hedging by banks, pose serious problems in terms of
financial stability.
Fair value accounting involves valuing as many balance and off balance sheet items as possible at
market value, or where there is no market value, at a valuation calculated using modelling techniques.
This appears to run counter to the principle of prudence, and to create artificial volatility in
earnings and equity.
Valuing all except held-to-maturity securities at market value, irrespective of liquidity or negotiability
or of the intention of the owner, contravenes the principle of prudence in that some of the potential
capital gains thus calculated may prove to be wholly illusory. Moreover, this approach will inevitably
lead to unjustifiably high volatility in earnings and equity, which might actually aggravate the
current confusion in the markets.
The IASB proposals on risk hedging have similar negative effects to those on fair value accounting.
The IASB requires mark-to-market valuation for all hedging instruments. The logical implication of
this approach – if the principle of symmetrical treatment is to be preserved – is that the same
valuation method should be used for hedged items as well. This proposal risks extending fair value
accounting to intermediation banking (where the hedged item is generally accounted for), with all
the attendant consequences in terms of prudence and volatility.
Two other IASB proposals could also have significant consequences for the financial statements of
companies in general, and not just those of banks: firstly the proposals on business
combinations and the treatment of goodwill, and secondly the rules on employee benefits (pension
liabilities and stock options).
The effect of these two types of proposal on financial stability is not clear. If, as the IASB suggests, a
purchase accounting approach is used for business combinations and goodwill is no longer amortised
but subject to regular impairment reviews, this would seem to promote greater transparency and in
future might even prevent some of the abuses surrounding corporate acquisitions. Similarly, the
systematic recognition in the income statement of pension liabilities and of stock option grants would
make corporate policies in these areas more transparent. However, a “big bang” application of these
new standards would probably put many companies into a difficult position, which in turn might
impair financial stability.134  Banque de France • FSR • June 2003
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I
n July 2002, a European regulation endorsed the
European Commission’s decision to require
European listed companies to adopt a common
accounting standards framework developed by the
IASB, a private body based in London.
This decision, which will become binding on
European listed companies for the preparation of
consolidated financial statements with effect from
2005, will lead to major changes in both existing
regulations and internal information systems.
The changes include many positive aspects: they
should harmonise the presentation of operations and
profits by companies in different countries,
enhancing the comparability of financial statements,
while also making it possible to access the world’s
biggest financial market (the United States) without
having to produce a new set of financial statements 4.
The need for reform is particularly acute at present,
with the lack of harmonisation adding to the general
confusion prevailing on the financial markets. The
contradictory signals likely to emanate from a group
that works with more than one set of standards tend
to undermine the credibility of financial
information.
The IASB has therefore initiated an extensive
written consultation exercise on its draft standards,
supplemented in the case of the draft IAS 39
standard by hearings at which interested parties can
make representations.
However, notwithstanding the fact that many of these
standards have not yet been finalised, this
harmonisation process raises a number of issues.
Some difficulties have more to do with the practical
issue of adapting to the new regime: any international
standard will tend to change the basis of existing
domestic rules. But there are also some wider issues
which may have an impact on financial stability.
At this stage, with the European Commission yet to
pronounce on the content of the standards, it is
worth raising two sets of crucial questions on the
issue of financial stability.
– Do these new rules, which give a central role to
market values, comply with the principle of
prudence in a European context where market
benchmarks are less customary than in
anglo-saxon economies? Will the new rules be
capable of remedying the shortcomings exposed
by the Enron affair? Will they provide a truer
and more complete view of risk?
– At the same time, is there not a risk that these
new rules may harm financial stability by
introducing artificial volatility?
The aim of this article is to examine these issues
– compliance with the principle of prudence and
impact in terms of volatility – using concrete
examples in order to give a better understanding of
both the nature and the implications of these new
rules. We will look first at those standards with a
strong impact on financial institutions (accounting
for credit risk, definition of the scope of
consolidation, fair value accounting, management
of hedging transactions). We will then examine
standards affecting all economic agents (merger and
acquisition accounting, recognition of
commitments such as employee benefits in the
form of pensions and stock options). Wherever
possible, a comparison will be made between
different accounting standards (American, French
and IAS). The latest known or proposed changes to
these standards will also be considered 5, and
possible amendments suggested.
4 This assumes of course that the American stock market regulator, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), recognises IASB standards as
being of equivalent quality to US standards.
5 For example, in the case of financial instruments, some suggestions for amendments to IAS 39 were proposed in response to an exposure draft
distributed in June 2002. Public round table discussions on this standard were held in March 2003.Banque de France • FSR • June 2003 135
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1|1 Major changes
within financial institutions
One of the main changes introduced by the draft
amendment to IAS 39 relates to provisions for credit
risk. The draft retains the basic principle whereby
the impairment loss equals the difference between
the book value of loans in the balance sheet
(amortised historical cost) and the present value of
the future cash flows actually expected from those
loans. However, it is proposed that provisions also be
applied collectively to all loans that are not individually
identified as impaired.
This is a major innovation, in that the present value
of expected future cash flows from non-impaired loans
must be measured using an initial internal rate of
return calculated on the basis of cash flows actually
expected at inception (taking into account estimates
of probable losses), and not on the basis of contractually
agreed cash flows. Logically, this initial internal rate
of return will be lower than the contractual rate, with
the difference representing the risk premium 6 charged
to the borrower in order to cover the statistically
foreseeable risk of non-recovery (see box 1). At the
time the loan is granted, if the bank has correctly
assessed its risk then the total amount of risk premium
to be recovered should in theory cover the entire risk
of loss. However, an imbalance may arise subsequently,
requiring a provision for impairment. This imbalance
may result either from a time lag between payment
defaults (usually irregular in timing) and the recovery
of risk premiums (regular in timing), or from a
deterioration in default experience relative to the
lender’s expectations at the time the loans were granted.
This IASB draft is in line with thinking developed
since the mid-1990s about more upfront methods for
credit risk provisioning by banks, often referred to
as “dynamic provisioning”, which has inspired a
range of initiatives in various countries. In particular,
the Banco de España introduced a regulation in 2000
requiring credit institutions to record provisions for
non-impaired loan books on a statistical basis. In
France, the Conseil national de la comptabilité (CNC),
the national accounting standard-setter, established
a working party at the request of the Commission
Bancaire and the French Treasury. This led to the
issuance of an exposure draft 7 in March 2002, which
recommends a very similar approach to that adopted
by the IASB.
6 Usually, this risk premium is recovered as a portion of the interest spread.
7 Exposure draft: proposed accounting standard issued for consultation.
1| Earlier recognition of credit risk
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1|2 Divergence
between impairment rules
and fair value accounting
The approach adopted by the IASB therefore reflects
the view expressed by bank supervisors that all loans
are subject to a statistically measurable credit risk from
inception, and that it is necessary that this real risk be
recognised as soon as possible in a bank’s balance sheet
and income statement without waiting for the risk to
be crystallised by a specific event. This approach is
based on an expected losses concept comparable
with that adopted by the Basel Committee for the
new solvency ratio.
This dynamic provisioning concept differs from fair
value 8 as defined by the IASB. Fair value accounting
makes no distinction between credit risk and other
forms of risk (interest rate, foreign exchange etc.)
which bear no relation to counterparty quality but
which the fair value concept is supposed to
encompass as well. By contrast, the treatment of credit
risk proposed by the IASB for loans that are not
individually identified as impaired aims to single out
the effect of counterparty risk.
Dynamic provisioning is particularly prudent in that
an asset can never be valued at more than historical
cost, unlike in fair value accounting, which would take
into account any positive impact from interest rates.
The valuation rules adopted in the draft amendment
to IAS 39 are therefore based not on any market
value but on historical loss experience, a position
similar to the Basel Committee requirements on
credit risk measurement associated with the reform
of the solvency ratio. These historical data may be
adjusted to take account of recent information that
better reflects current conditions, but this does not
necessarily involve using market prices, unlike the
fair value approach.
A loan valuation method based on market prices
would inevitably introduce extra volatility into
banks’ revenues and equity, giving a distorted image
of their underlying performance and adding a
further element of instability. By contrast, the
application of accounting rules based on dynamic
8 Higher of net realisable value and value in use, the latter being defined as the present  value of expected future cash flows discounted at the rate
of return expected by the market. Often treated as synonymous  with market value in the interests of simplicity.
9 See the European System of Central Banks (ESCB) response to the IASC proposal on full fair value (October 2001).
provisioning would probably tend to be a stabilising
influence on bank financial statements.
1|3 Reduced volatility
in banks financial statements?
Considerations on dynamic provisioning have
developed from the observation that existing
accounting standards in France and most other
developed countries are too restrictive, and ultimately
not prudent enough because credit risk provisions are
not usually recognised until a fairly late stage. Under
existing rules, a provision cannot be recorded until a
loan is acknowledged as doubtful, implying that a
specific event must trigger the provision. This means
that provisions fail to reflect a loan book’s true inherent
risk, which in economic terms exists from the date of
inception. Current accounting rules therefore tend to create
a highly cyclical pattern in banks’ earnings from lending
activities, with impairment provisions appearing only
at low points in the economic cycle when defaults cause
the risk to crystallise. The knock–on effect on the
financing of the economy can be substantial at a time
of sharply fluctuating economic conditions.
Conversely, the dynamic provisioning principle backed
by bank supervisors and central banks 9, and since
adopted by the IASB, anticipates the risk and spreads
the cost over a longer period, cushioning the impact
felt when loan impairment losses are recognised in a
single accounting period.
This clearly gives a better fit with prudential rules, as it
brings accounting into line with a more pre-emptive,
pro-active approach to credit risk management, as
recommended by the Basel reforms through their
recognition of internal rating systems. These changes
should encourage banks to develop information systems
capable of allocating assets to risk categories and of
establishing reliable statistics on the probability of default
and of losses caused by default. These tools should
facilitate the calculation of provisions for loan books that
are not individually identified as impaired. The approach
to credit risk developed by the IASB may be seen as an
accounting method complementing the improvements in
risk management and prudential analysis which the
reform of the solvency ratio aims to achieve.Banque de France • FSR • June 2003 137
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Box 2
Comparison of provisions for credit risk under current rules and under IAS 39
Assumptions
Portfolio of loans of 10,000 with bullet redemption at the end of 10 years. 12% contractual interest rate. 10.21%
internal rate of return.
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Total annual provisions (specific + dynamic) under IAS 39 rules
The chart above shows how dynamic provisioning reduces the volatility of amounts charged to provisions for
credit risk each year.









Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 Year 6 Year 7 Year 8 Year 9 Year 10
Cumulative provisions under existing rules (specific provisions) 
Total cumulative provisions (specific + dynamic) under IAS 39 rules
1,400
The chart above shows how dynamic provisioning gives a higher level of cumulative provisions, reflecting better
anticipation of credit risk.138  Banque de France • FSR • June 2003
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Box 3
Basel II and IAS: convergence or divergence?
Bank supervisors set great store by accounting standards given that these standards have hitherto formed the
basis for the calculation of ratios. Since accounting reform will have prudential implications, an analysis of the
relationship between accounting and prudential rules is highly relevant.
Looking beyond conceptual issues, the two sets of reforms are following similar timetables. The new solvency
ratio will come into force in 2006, while the new accounting rules will apply to the consolidated financial
statements of listed companies in Europe from 2005. In addition, both will have major consequences in terms
of bank information systems; their convergent aspects should therefore be exploited to the full in order to
optimise the positive effects of the changes. However, areas of divergence remain.
There are major areas of convergence …
The objective of enhancing and harmonising published financial information
On this point, the draft standard amending IAS 30 on financial statement disclosures makes it compulsory to
publish the information recommended in the new solvency ratio, in particular data on a bank’s geographical or
sector risk exposure and on the management and hedging of such risk.
Analysis and calculation methods based on internal management systems
The new ratio gives banks a strong incentive to develop their internal credit risk analysis systems. Similarly, the new
accounting standards have significant implications for these systems, because in the absence of market benchmarks
many valuations will be based on estimates derived from internal modelling. The need to source upstream data for use
in accounting and prudential calculations could justify the creation of data warehouses shared by the two applications.
 Harmonisation of credit risk calculation methods
Both types of standard use the “expected loss” concept, applying statistical probability calculations to all loans,
including non-impaired loans. This development, which the prudential authorities favour, is based on the principle
that any lending activity carries an inherent risk.
… but divergences remain
Accounting standards favour a short-term perspective
The IAS approach orientates valuation and presentation methods towards meeting the needs of investors, by
using market value (fair value) as a benchmark. By contrast, bank supervisors take into account the management
time-frame so as to develop valuation methods less detrimental to the principle of prudence and the maintenance
of financial stability.
Different conception of equity
While equity is fundamental to prudential rules in that it is the ultimate bulwark against losses, the IAS
approach tends rather to view equity as a variable that can be used to adjust for changes in the valuation of
balance sheet items. This different conception of equity, coupled with the overvaluation of balance sheets at
market prices under the IAS approach, is liable to result in high volatility in earnings and equity, which in turn
may necessitate restatements for prudential purposes.
Each type of standard has its own calculation methods
The IAS approach invariably favours discounted cash flow techniques. In terms of credit risk, the time-frame for
valuation is slightly different, while in determining the amount of impairment, the accounting standard takes into
account the risk premium built into the lending rate. From the prudential perspective, risk premiums are taken
into account only for certain revolving loans with high interest spreads.Banque de France • FSR • June 2003 139
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2| Redefining the balance sheet representation of risk
2|1 Three different approaches
are under discussion
Recent scandals have underlined the need for full
and comprehensive disclosure of the risks to which
businesses are exposed. Defining the scope of
consolidation is of crucial importance, as is the use of
financial engineering. Financial engineering, which
aims to remove a special purpose entity (SPE) 10 from
consolidation or to take assets and liabilities off
balance sheet, sometimes followed immediately by
a guarantee given to the transferee, makes it more
difficult to monitor the extent of the commitments
of a company or a group.
The question of how these risks are to be reflected in
balance sheets is hence of fundamental importance in
assessing financial stability, which could in fact be
undermined by an accounting rule that does not
accurately reflect the actual risk exposure of
companies and groups of companies.
The debate as to how such risks should be reflected
in accounting and financial information currently
focuses on three different approaches.
The first approach is based on legal criteria, linking
derecognition to the transfer of the contractual rights
associated with ownership and to the enforceability of
the transaction against third parties.
For example, French general accounting rules on asset
derecognition refer to legal criteria which do not always
give a true reflection of the actual risk exposure, except
in certain specifically defined circumstances 11.
Similarly, French rules on consolidation make the
legal criterion of ownership of an equity interest the
decisive factor for non-financial companies.
Inclusion of special purpose entities in the
consolidation is still conditional upon the existence
of an interest in the capital 12.
At present, the application of American accounting
rules is also based on compliance with legal form.
They favour a loss of control approach, whereby an
asset is derecognised if the contractual rights are
transferred and the transfer is enforceable against
third parties, with guarantees being recorded
separately. The criteria used to analyse transactions
relate to whether or not the transferred assets are
beyond the reach of the transferor’s creditors, and
whether or not those assets are managed other than
in the sole interests of the transferor. The first
criterion has more to do with legal form than with
economic substance, and makes derecognition
easier. The second is applied very broadly in
deconsolidation transactions. Only a very small
minority stake (3%) has to be given to third parties
to avoid consolidation. This rule was used by Enron
to conceal impaired assets in non-consolidated
special purpose entities.
However, the position now seems to be changing
with Interpretation 46 13, published in January 2003
by the FASB 14, on the consolidation of “variable
interest entities” 15. This follows the “risks and
rewards” approach, with the notable exception of
securitisation transactions.
The second approach is based on the concept of risks
and rewards. Under this approach, derecognition of an
asset is allowed if and only if the transferor transfers the
majority of the risks and the rights to profits associated
with the asset. This is the approach used in the United
Kingdom. As regards the consolidation of special
purpose entities, French rules applicable to banks 16
and international rules are based on the concept of
control, assessed by reference to substance rather than
form, using criteria similar to those applied in a risk
and rewards approach.
10 A special purpose entity is a legal entity (the legal form of which may vary) set up by a company for a sole and specific purpose (such as asset
securitisation, leasing or research and development).
11 For example, economic substance prevails over legal form in bank accounting regulations on repos and discounting. In addition,
CRB Regulation 89-07 makes the derecognition of assigned loans conditional upon the lack of any possibility of repurchase or any underwriting
of credit risk. However, this rule applies only to banks, and only to assignments of loans that are not part of securitisation transactions.
12 However, the law on financial security proposes to abolish ownership of a capital interest as a precondition for consolidation.
13 Interpretation 46 relates to the text of Accounting Research Bulletin (ARB) 51, issued in 1958 by the American Institute of Certified Public
Accountants (AICPA), on consolidated financial statements.
14 FASB: Financial Accounting Standards Board, the American accounting standard-setter.
15 Term used by the FASB instead of the less precise “special purpose entities”.
16 Unlike those that apply to non-financial companies (see above).140  Banque de France • FSR • June 2003
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For French banks, therefore, a special purpose entity
is consolidated if the group controls the entity and
exercises this control in its own sole interest. Control
is assessed as a matter of substance, with no
reference to formal legal provisions such as the
existence of an interest in the capital or of an explicit
agreement, by examining the overall economic basis
of the transaction 17.
In the case of international standards, interpretation
SIC 12 18 requires a special purpose entity to be
consolidated “when the substance of the relationship
between an enterprise and the SPE indicates that
the SPE is controlled by that enterprise”, control
being assessed by reference to a very broad definition
using similar criteria to those contained in the French
regulation. The consequence is that virtually all
special purpose entities have to be consolidated.
The third approach to derecognition is that proposed
by the IASB in its draft amendment to IAS 32 and 39
and based on the concept of continuing involvement,
in other words the extent to which the transferor is
involved in the transferred asset. This approach
requires assets to be derecognised in proportion to
the risks and rights to profits transferred. In practice,
the transferor must retain in its balance sheet the
portion of the asset in which it has continuing
involvement, for example the maximum amount of
any guarantee given 19.
This approach, still in draft form, attempts to resolve
the inherent difficulties of the other approaches and
mitigate their disadvantages.
2|2 What should
a balance sheet show?
In assessing accounting standards, the primary
concern of the prudential authorities is to safeguard
the prudent rules which faithfully represent the true
position of companies and the risks to which they
are exposed. Consequently, these rules must make
it possible to identify special purpose entities in
determining the scope of consolidation, and to
prevent certain abuses of asset derecognition.
From this point of view, each of the three approaches
has strengths and weaknesses, depending on
whether it emphasises a presentation based on legal
form and ownership or one based on economic
substance. Either way, they will usually result in
balance sheets that look totally different.
The risks and rewards approach, which is based on
an economic analysis of control, is the most prudent
in that it gives a snapshot overview of the extent of
the company’s commitments.
Conversely, an approach based on the concept
of loss of control decouples exposure to risks and
rewards from recognition and derecognition: a
transfer may be recorded in the financial
statements even if the transferor retains the risks.
This approach may give a misleading impression
of a company’s real performances and risk
exposures by systematically underestimating
such exposures.
The IASB has attempted to set out a middle way.
The concept of continuing involvement allows the
maximum risk exposure to be shown by allowing
derecognition of the asset alongside retention in the
balance sheet of the non-transferred portion. This
new approach is attractive in theory but leaves room
for improvement, especially in the way in which it
is applied.
The fundamental problem is therefore to determine
whether, in accounting terms, the aim of a balance sheet
is to reflect all the risks and rewards of operations in
which a company is involved, or to show the maximum
risk to which it is exposed, or merely to record those
operations over which it has legal control. For the
prudential authorities, methods that disclose risk
exposure are the most satisfactory.
17 The overall economic basis is assessed inter alia by reference to the following criteria: decision-making powers  over the entity's ordinary
activities or assets; ability to enjoy all or the majority of the entity's profits; bearing of the majority of the risks relating to the entity.
18 Interpretation of IAS 27 on consolidation, issued by the Standing Interpretations Committee (SIC).
19 In such cases, this amount is retained in the balance sheet but the rest of the value of the asset may be derecognised.Banque de France • FSR • June 2003 141
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3| More extensive use of fair value
3|1 Fair value dominates
the new international standards
The United States was the first country to favour fair
value (ideally assessed by reference to market values)
for the valuation of financial instruments. According
to SFAC 1 21, the primary objective of financial
statements is to provide information that helps promote
the efficient allocation of resources and assists markets
to function effectively. It was realised in the United
States that previous accounting standards allowed
unrealised losses not to be recognised immediately,
especially on derivatives. To prevent this, American
standards required the use of fair value accounting for
all derivative instruments. By doing so, the standards
favoured a short-term representation of transactions
based on their immediate realisable value.
In 1997, the IASC issued a proposal that all
financial assets and liabilities 22 be stated at fair
value. Following heavy criticism, a temporary
compromise appeared to have been reached with
IAS 39, which restricted fair value accounting to
negotiable assets and liabilities. This meant for
example, in the case of banks, that intermediation
(lending/deposit-taking) activities were excluded
from the fair value requirement.
However, some aspects of IAS 39 – which is very
similar to the American standard on financial
instruments  23, and which is of fundamental
importance to banks in that it affects virtually their
entire balance sheet – appear to be leading
imperceptibly towards a universal fair value
accounting model. The same convention is also used
in a number of other IASB standards.
2|3 A sensitive issue,
and a potential source
of financial instability
The difficulty of this problem, and its potential
implications for financial stability if unidentified
risks were to emerge, explain why this issue is
currently under close scrutiny in most countries.
For example, American standards on the
consolidation of special purpose entities (SPEs) are
being re-examined. Some improvements have been
made with Interpretation 46, which resolves a
number of problems and is closer to international
standards. However, this interpretation does
not cover some types of SPE, referred to
as “qualifying” SPEs in American standards. These
mainly comprise securitisation vehicles,
consolidation of which continues to be based on a
formal definition of control: it is enough to
demonstrate that at least 10% of the beneficial
interests are in the hands of third parties for
deconsolidation to be allowed. In this specific case,
the only response to recent events has been to raise
the deconsolidation threshold from 3% to 10%. It is
however debatable whether such a measure is
adequate to reflect actual risk exposures and to
remedy abuses of the rules such as those observed
in the past.
In France, the Commission des opérations de bourse and
the Commission bancaire published a joint
recommendation at the end of 2002 on special purpose
entities and asset derecognition, in which they suggested a
number of improvements to French accounting regulations.
These improvements aim to tighten the rules, by applying
a “risks and rewards” analysis which better represents the
actual risks to which companies are exposed.
Generally speaking, it is essential to resolve the
difficulties inherent in each approach by definitively
establishing the principle of substance over form.
In practice, the continuing involvement method
advocated by the IASB could prove a satisfactory
solution, subject to clarification in certain areas 20.
20 Clarification is needed particularly on pass-through arrangements. These are agreements under which the transferor continues to collect cash
flows from the transferred asset, remits these cash flows to the transferee on a timely basis (with no obligation to pay any other amounts to the
transferee other than those received, and with no possibility of reinvesting the cash flows for its own benefit), and is contractually unable to sell or
pledge the transferred asset or use it for its own benefit. If all these conditions are met, the transferor is allowed to derecognise the asset or a
portion of the asset from its balance sheet.
21 Statement of Financial Accounting Concepts, the American conceptual framework defining the objectives and principles that must be reflected
in accounting standards.
22 IASB terminology uses a very broad definition of financial assets and liabilities. In the case of banks, it includes loans and trade receivables as
well as deposits and borrowings.142  Banque de France • FSR • June 2003
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This trend diverges from the rules and customs applied
in France, and in Europe generally, which continue to
be based on management intent. For example, in the
case of banks, French standards only allow
mark-to-market valuation to be used for financial
instruments held for trading purposes, and even then
subject to strict conditions in terms of volume,
frequency of trading and liquidity.
By contrast, securities held with the intention of
retaining them to maturity remain at historical cost,
and held for sale securities not regularly traded on
a market are shown in the balance sheet at the lower
of historical cost or market value.
Although IAS 39 (Financial Instruments: Recognition
and Measurement) claims that management intent
should be retained as the basis for accounting treatment,
it introduces major innovations relative to existing French
and European accounting rules.
The main innovation relates to portfolios of held
for sale and similar securities 24, the vast majority of
which would be shown at market value rather than
at the lower of historical cost or market value.
Moreover, because the IASB takes the view that
reference to market values should become a
fundamental principle, restrictive conditions would
be set on the inclusion of financial instruments in
the category of assets measured at historical cost.
In particular, the loan book may only be treated as
part of intermediation banking activities (i.e. valued
at historical cost) to the extent that the loans are
originated by the enterprise itself. Loans which are
purchased, for example as a result of securitisation
deals, are excluded from this treatment. In addition,
the practical arrangements for hedging these loan
books effectively result in their being measured at
fair value (see below).
This slide towards universal fair value accounting
risks being exacerbated by the application of a fair
value designation option, whereby management may
elect to record any asset or liability at fair value. This
option, included in the draft amendment to IAS 39,
has been introduced to simplify the application of
the provisions on hedging arrangements. It is
nonetheless highly problematic, for both practical
and conceptual reasons.
3|2 These provisions run counter
to the principle of prudence…
Fair value is very easy to determine when it can be
obtained by reference to values in an active, liquid
market. However, if a financial instrument is not actively
traded on a market or its market value cannot be
determined by reference to similar instruments, the IASB
recommends using valuations derived from
mathematical models.
It goes without saying that the absence of any
universally-accepted model raises problems in terms
of reliability and of comparability between financial
statements. What is more, use of such models may make
it easier to manipulate profits in a way that users of
financial statements will find hard to detect. A company’s
performance might be enhanced by an over-optimistic
valuation of instruments with little or no liquidity.
This drawback may prove only temporary if future
developments in the capital markets make it possible
to obtain a reliable valuation of the majority of
financial instruments.
At present, the sophistication (and hence the
reliability) of market valuations varies
considerably from one market to another. While
anglo-saxon markets are often active and liquid,
their European counterparts have yet to reach the
same level of maturity. The recommended general
method of using market prices as the basis for
valuations is hence not always suited to the economic
reality in each country. Even in the case of
apparently efficient markets, it is necessary to
ensure that there is sufficient depth and liquidity,
as there may be a risk of manipulation in a market
with too few players or with too little depth. The
Enron affair, for example, suggested that the prices
quoted in the US electricity market had been
subject to manipulation.
23 FAS 133, applicable in the United States with effect from 1 January 2001.
24 In French bank accounting terms, this includes securities held in portfolio, other long-term securities holdings, equity holdings and shares in
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Box 4
Comparison of the impact of the revaluation of a held for sale securities
portfolio under IAS and French accounting standards
Assumptions
Securities bought on t0 for 1,000. Market value is 1,700 on Q1, 1,200 on Q2 800 on Q3.
Under IFRS (IAS 39), unrealised gains and losses are recognised in the income statement or taken directly to
equity (at the reporting entity's option). Under French standards, only unrealised losses are recognised, via a
provision for impairment which must be charged to the income statement.
s e i t i r u c e s e l a s - r o f - e l b a l i a v a f o e u l a V
t e e h s e c n a l a b e h t n i
e g n a h c l a u n n A
y t i u q e r o e m o c n i t e n n i
s e g n a h c e v i t a l u m u C
y t i u q e r o e m o c n i t e n n i
0 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q
P A A G h c n e r F 0 0 0 , 10 0 0 , 10 0 0 , 10 0 80 0 0 0 2 -0 0 0 0 2 -
S A I 0 0 0 , 10 0 7 , 10 0 2 , 10 0 80 0 70 0 5 -0 0 4 -0 0 70 0 20 0 2 -
P A A G S U 0 0 0 , 10 0 7 , 10 0 2 , 10 0 80 0 70 0 5 -0 0 4 -0 0 70 0 20 0 2 -
Annual impact of recognition of charges in value of available-for-sale securities in the income statement










Polynomial (annual change: French GAAP)
600
Annual change: French GAAP
Annual change: IAS Polynomial (annual change: IAS)
Cumulative impact of recognition of charges in value of available-for-sale securities in the income statement








Polynomial (cumulative change: IAS)
Polynomial (cumulative change: French GAAP)
600
Cumulative change: French GAAP
Cumulative change: IAS
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Box 5
Looking beyond accounting conventions, questions should be asked
about the economic impact of extra volatility in net income or equity
A distinction can be drawn between two sources of volatility in financial statements:
– a one-off source associated with a change in accounting regime, the consequences of which will be reflected in
a single adjustment to equity in company balance sheets. This change of regime would apply to all existing
assets and liabilities. It could create shock waves in terms of analysts' perceptions of these companies, especially
if no impact study has been carried out in advance of the introduction of new standards. On this point, it is
regrettable that the adoption of new standards by the IASB is not preceded by impact studies, along the lines
of those carried out by the Basel Committee in connection with the reform of bank solvency;
– an ongoing source, associated with the extension of the use of market benchmarks in place of more stable
valuation methods.
In this case, the economic impact of the additional volatility of financial statements depends on whether or not
the company is listed.
For listed companies, economic value may be expressed as a multiple of market capitalisation. It could hence be
argued that the extra volatility of financial statements has an economic impact if it is liable to increase the
volatility of the share price. Greater uncertainty about the share price will then make it more expensive for the
company to raise finance through the markets.
The degree of influence on the share price will depend on the extent of the earnings surprise arising from the
publication of the financial statements. If analysts anticipate the nature and extent of the accounting fluctuations
correctly, the share price will be unaffected. The ability of analysts to anticipate in this way depends on their
having been trained in the new accounting standards, and  on the adoption of adequate financial communication
policies by companies constantly obliged to incorporate the impact of changing market values in their balance
sheets and income statements.
This learning curve in the interpretation of financial statements, for analysts and companies alike, creates a
conduit for volatility to feed through from financial statements to share prices that may last several years.
 In the case of unlisted companies, value is analysed rather by reference to a number of key financial balances,
largely drawn from the balance sheet and income statement. The impact of additional financial statement
volatility and the disappearance of existing accounting benchmarks could give rise to complications in valuing
these key balances. This uncertainty may lead to a reduction in the value of unlisted companies.
However, the ability of economic agents to adapt to changes in accounting regime should not be underestimated.
Faced with the possible drawbacks of additional financial statement volatility, they may respond by adapting
their practices in order to mitigate these drawbacks.
If this happens, the question needs to be asked whether these new practices will lead to greater economic
efficiency, or whether they will introduce new and poorly-understood risks.
In particular, these new accounting standards could amplify financial cycles, with procyclical effects on the
real economy. These future standards will narrow the application of prudence in asset valuations, in favour of
market values. Compared with today, this would result in a more flattering presentation of company accounts
(especially in the financial sector) during upswings in the financial markets, and a less flattering presentation
when the markets turned down. If company accounts become an ever closer reflection of the markets, fundamental
analysis of these accounts – currently a useful reality check on market trends – risks becoming marginalised.Banque de France • FSR • June 2003 145
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These difficulties in verifying fair value could foster
uncertainty and suspicion about financial information.
The general application of fair value to securities
portfolios is also contrary to the principle of prudence
in that it treats unrealised gains and losses identically.
Under the principle of prudence as it currently
applies, unrealised gains are not recognised unless
an instrument is liquid and management intends to
sell it in the near term. IAS 39 abandons this principle
of prudence for the valuation of securities portfolios,
the bulk of which is to be valued at market price.
3|3 … and may lead to the
development of artificial
volatility
If financial instruments are systematically measured at
fair value, the net income and the equity of banks – the
main users of financial instruments – will be subject to
greater fluctuations than at present.
Difficulties in interpreting this extra volatility may impair
the proper assessment of performances, and hence
produce the exact opposite to the desired effect of
improving investor information. It will become harder
to interpret net income figures, and to distinguish
between changes caused by market fluctuations and
those arising from the enterprise’s own operations.
External analysts and the supervisory authorities will
find it hard to look through the volatility of net income
to detect the first warning signs of financial difficulties.
In order to guard against net income volatility, credit
institutions may be tempted to prefer short-term and
variable-rate financing, which generate no interest
rate risk, to long-term and fixed-rate financing. The
interest rate risk currently managed by banks via
the transformation of short-term sources of funds
into medium-term loans would then be passed on to
non-financial economic agents, who are not best
placed to manage this risk.
4| Micro-economic management
of hedging transactions
4|1 Highly complex hedge
management techniques
IAS 39 on recognition and measurement of financial
instruments introduces radical changes in the accounting
treatment applied to hedging transactions 25.
IAS 39 defines two types of hedge, which do not
correspond to existing definitions: the fair value
hedge, which protects against fluctuations in the
value of balance sheet items, and the cash flow
hedge, which protects future revenues or
transactions.
IAS 39 also stipulates that only derivative
instruments may be used as hedging instruments,
and requires all derivative financial instruments to
be measured at fair value even if they are used for
hedging purposes. This effectively makes fair value
accounting obligatory for all hedging instruments.
The accounting methods prescribed for these two types
of hedge differ markedly. Changes in value of fair value
hedges must be recognised in the income statement, while
changes in value of cash flow hedges are taken to equity.
In order to cancel out these changes in value and to reflect
the stability which is usually the aim of hedging, the hedged
instrument will now have to be measured in the same way
as the hedge itself, in other words at fair value (to the extent
of the hedged risk), even where it would normally be
measured at historical cost – as in the case, for example, of
intermediation banking. The impact of remeasurement at
fair value will be taken to the income statement.
This arrangement, which has the merit of ensuring
symmetrical treatment of gains and losses on both
instruments, reverses current practice. At present,
hedging instruments are valued using the rules that
apply to the hedged instrument, i.e. at historical cost
in most cases.
25 These principles draw heavily upon American standards, in particular FAS 133 on derivative instruments.146  Banque de France • FSR • June 2003
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Even though this reversal of hedge accounting rules
adds to the complexity of book-keeping in this area,
it does not fundamentally change a company’s net
income, as under normal circumstances the
valuations of the two sides of a hedging operation
should cancel out. However, it inevitably leads to an
extension of fair value accounting.
In addition, changes in value of cash flow hedges
– which by definition cannot be matched against changes
in value of a hedged item, because no such item exists
as yet – are taken directly to equity, which is liable to
increase the volatility of equity.
IAS 39 also imposes significant restrictions on what
qualifies as a hedge, and does not recognise existing
practices adopted by European financial institutions,
in particular macro-hedging 26.
Compared with existing French accounting
standards, IAS 39 introduces the following changes:
– all derivatives must be recognised in the balance
sheet at fair value 27;
– changes in the fair value of all hedging derivatives
are recognised in the income statement (fair
value hedges) or as movements in equity (cash
flow hedges) 28.
4|2 The treatment
of these transactions overlooks
economic substance…
The general rules proposed by IAS 39 for the
measurement of assets, liabilities and derivative
instruments are not always internally consistent. Assets
are measured at fair value, except for securities held to
maturity and originated loans. Liabilities are measured
at historical cost, except for those related directly to
trading activities (for example short selling of securities)
or those for which management has elected fair value
designation. All derivative financial instruments are
measured at fair value. Application of these measurement
rules leads to differences in treatment depending on the nature
of the financial instrument, and not (as is currently the case)
on management intent.
Moreover, the treatment of hedging transactions does not
reflect their economic substance, and results in
economically similar transactions being treated differently.
For example, in the case of a fair value hedge, a
fixed-rate loan hedged by a swap exchanging the fixed
rate for a variable rate will not be valued in the same
way as a variable-rate loan. The variable-rate loan
will remain at historical cost, while the fixed-rate loan
will be remeasured and changes in its fair value taken
to the income statement to cancel out changes in the
fair value of the swap.
As a result, book-keeping for fair value hedges will be
extremely complicated. The major drawback in using
fair value hedges is the obligation to remeasure the
hedged item (even if it would normally remain at
historical cost) in order to comply with the principle of
fair value accounting for derivatives, viewed by the IASB
as fundamental. One solution that would preclude the
need to change the logic of valuing the hedged item at
historical cost, and at the same time refrain from
technically undermining the valuation of derivative
instruments, could be to propose recording the valuation
of the hedging instrument and the revaluation of the
risk-hedged component in a single accruals and deferrals
account in the balance sheet.
The distinction between fair value hedges and cash
flow hedges, each with different accounting
treatments, will also complicate the management
of hedging transactions.
In addition, choices could be made between fair
value hedges and cash flow hedges in economically
equivalent situations, with very different impacts
on net income or equity. The existence of these
alternative treatments runs counter to the objective of
financial statement comparability, and could encourage
a flattering presentation of net income to the detriment
of prudence (see box 6).
The IASB has considered improvements to IAS 39,
aware that its application poses problems. Among
the amendments, it is proposed to make it easier to
classify financial instruments as held for trading,
with no other condition than that the enterprise
designates them as such, so that they may be
systematically measured at fair value.
26 Operations intended to hedge the net overall risk, usually interest rate risk, which arises from the sometimes contrary effects of all the risk to
which the institution is exposed. Macro-hedging often means effectively stabilising the interest spread generated across the full range of a
bank's intermediation activities.
27 Under existing French GAAP, derivatives held to hedge transactions valued at historical cost themselves remain in the balance sheet at historical
cost (which is usually low), in accordance with the symmetrical treatment principle.
28 Under French GAAP, these changes in value are currently either not recognised or are included in accrued or deferred income/expense.Banque de France • FSR • June 2003 147
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Box 6
Example of the difference in accounting treatment
between a cash flow hedge and a fair value hedge under IAS 39
Assumptions
A fixed-rate financial asset is financed by a variable-rate liability. A swap is contracted whereby a fixed rate is
paid and a variable rate received. The purpose of the swap is to eliminate the sensitivity of the future interest
spread to changes in interest rates.
) t s o c l a c i r o t s i h = ( e u l a v r i a F
0 t1 t
t e s s a l a i c n a n i F 0 0 0 , 10 0 8% 0 1 e t a r t s e r e t n i d e x i F
y t i l i b a i l l a i c n a n i F 0 0 0 , 10 0 0 , 1 ) 0 t t a s a % 9 = R O B I R U E ( % 5 , 0 + R O B I R U E : e t a r t s e r e t n i e l b a i r a V
p a w s e t a r t s e r e t n I 00 8 1d e v i e c e r R O B I R U E , d i a p % 9
s t n e m u r t s n i e s e h t y b d e t a r e n e g s w o l f h s a c f o n o i t a n i b m o c e h t m o r f g n i s i r a d a e r p s t s e r e t n I
) t e s s a l a i c n a n i f ( d e v i e c e r e t a r t s e r e t n i d e x i F % 0 1 +
) p a w s ( d i a p e t a r t s e r e t n i d e x i F % 9 -
) p a w s ( d e v i e c e r e t a r t s e r e t n i e l b a i r a V r o b i r u E +
) y t i l i b a i l l a i c n a n i f ( d i a p e t a r t s e r e t n i e l b a i r a V ) % 5 , 0 + r o b i r u E ( –
d e t a r e n e g d a e r p s t s e r e t n I % 5 , 0 +
IAS 39 accounting principles applying to these transactions
The sensitivity of the interest spread to movements in EURIBOR is eliminated. From an economic point of view,
the swap is a hedging instrument reducing interest rate exposure. However, IAS 39 does not allow the hedging of
net risk positions, which means that the swap must be designated as a hedge of either the asset or the liability. If
the bank decides to designate the asset as the hedged instrument, the hedge is a fair value hedge, as the interest
rate risk relates to the value in the balance sheet. If the bank decides to designate the liability as the hedged
instrument, the hedge is a cash flow hedge, as the interest rate risk relates to the future interest flows.
Accounting treatment based on a fair value hedge of the asset
The change in the fair value of the asset (-200) is recognised as a loss, and the carrying value of the asset is
reduced by the same amount. The change in the fair value of the swap (+180) is recognised as a gain, and as
an asset in the balance sheet. The net result is a loss of 20, equivalent to the ineffective portion of the hedge,
while total assets are reduced by 20 (-200 for the financial asset, +180 for the swap).
Accounting treatment based on a cash flow hedge of the liability
The change in the fair value of the swap ( +180) is taken directly to equity, and recognised as an asset. There is
no change in the income statement, and total equity and assets increase (+ 180).
e g d e h w o l f h s a c a d n a e g d e h e u l a v r i a f a n o d e s a b s t l u s e r n e e w t e b n o s i r a p m o C
e g d e h e u l a v r i a Fe g d e h w o l f h s a C
s t e s s a l a t o t n i e g n a h C 0 2 -0 8 1 +
y t i u q e n i e g n a h C 0 2 -0 8 1 +
e m o c n i t e n n i e g n a h C 0 2 -0
Conclusion
Depending on whether the asset or the liability is designated as the hedged item, the impact of the accounting
treatment on net income and equity is very different. This could give scope for choosing a particular treatment
solely to achieve a particular accounting effect.148  Banque de France • FSR • June 2003
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Box 7
International accounting standardisation and financial stability
IAS 39 runs to nearly 600 pages including interpretations, and is not so much an exposition of basic principles
as a mass of rules. This is at odds with the IASB's claim to have a set of standards founded on principles, rather
than a rules-based system on the lines of the American model, the limitations of which have been exposed by
the current crisis of confidence.
Intended as a temporary standard based on the American FAS 133, IAS 39 contains numerous inconsistencies,
alternative accounting treatments contrary to the objective of comparability, and methods of accounting for
certain activities (such as the management of interest rate risk by banks) that are seriously divorced from
reality.
The inconsistencies arise in particular from the application of a hybrid model (historical cost and fair value)
based less on management intent and reality than on the nature of the instruments. Different measurement
rules are used for instruments with the same economic characteristics (see above). Management intent is
retained as a criterion for non-derivative instruments, but derivative instruments must be measured at fair
value irrespective of management intent. This inconsistency, together with other rules, creates a high degree of
complexity in hedge accounting.
IAS 39 requires changes in the value of hedging transactions designated as cash flow hedges to be taken to
equity. This so-called "equity" will ultimately be recycled to the income statement. Consequently, it is no more
than temporary equity, which is a contradiction in terms as well as a source of artificial volatility.
Global hedging of the interest rate risk arising from intermediation activities is an inherent part of banking
activities in Europe, which are characterised by the preponderance of fixed-rate lending to the wider economy.
The solutions currently proposed by the IASB do not allow the reality of this management technique to be
reflected in financial statements.
Fair value hedging is by definition inappropriate, as the banks are not seeking to hedge the risk of changes in
value for their intermediation activities, which are accounted for at historical cost. In addition, under the
proposals as they stand, hedging of a net position is not allowed.
This is why, in its implementation guidance on IAS 39, the IASB has devised a solution for dealing with interest rate
risk hedges that is based on the cash flow hedge method and is constructed using variable rate maturity schedules
(IGC 121-2). For the majority of European banks which manage interest rate risk by hedging net fixed-rate mismatches,
the methodology proposed results in a complex, artificial construct decoupled from the economic reality.
The documentation on cash flow hedges stipulated by IGC 121-2 requires banks to convert the fixed-rate maturity
schedules arising from their activities and used by them to manage interest rate risk into variable-rate maturity
schedules The net future variable-rate cash flow positions constructed in this way require a time-consuming
search for equivalent gross positions, as the standard does not allow hedging of net positions. This exercise not
only creates artificial volatility, it also generates operational accounting risks due to the need to prepare complex
documentation that has no relationship to reality.
The IASB is finalising the revised IAS 39 after having received numerous comments, and in the light of round
table discussions held in March 2003. It is important that the standard to be proposed take account of the reality
of European financial markets, of the way banks manage interest rate risks arising on their intermediation
activities, and of the solutions put forward by banks, regulators and accountancy professionals.
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This new option is designed in particular to resolve
the difficulties posed by the application of the hedge
accounting techniques specified in IAS 39. By
measuring all instruments at fair value, the
symmetrical treatment required in hedge accounting
would be achieved without the need to either
document or demonstrate the existence of a hedge.
Consequently, having made hedge accounting highly
complex, the IASB now seems to be suggesting a simpler
alternative, which is none other than the universal
application of fair value accounting.
4|3 … and is liable to generate
more volatility
and reduced use of hedging
In general, the proposed rules do not reflect the
risk management methods currently used by
Europe’s leading credit institutions, which make
particular use of macro-hedging and internal hedging
contracts to transfer risks from their various entities
to a specialist unit.
The IASB’s refusal to recognise such methods leads
to accounting treatments, and more generally
economic effects, that may be exactly the opposite
of what was intended.
By treating certain hedges as speculative transactions,
i.e. marked to market, IAS 39 once again generates high
volatility in net income and equity, with no economic
justification. The treatment of cash flow hedges is
particularly likely to generate a high degree of
volatility in equity. This volatility is all the more
undesirable for being artificial.
In addition, the refusal of the IASB to recognise
widely-used risk management techniques could induce
banks to abandon these hedging methods, even though
they are viewed as prudent and effective from a business
standpoint.
The position of the financial sector could end up
being weakened by the effect of an accounting rule
if credit institutions were tempted to abandon part
of their interest rate hedging in an attempt to reduce
the volatility of their net income and equity without
having to abandon their transformation activities.
5| A short-term view of mergers and acquisitions
5|1 Similar treatment to US GAAP
The new international standards could also have a crucial
impact on the accounting treatment of business
combinations, and hence play a role in the consolidation
of the international economy. In this area, the US
standard FAS 141 (applicable from 1 July 2001)
abolished the option of using the pooling of interests
method for the first-time consolidation of a
recently-acquired company. This method firstly
allowed the assets and liabilities of the acquiree not
to be remeasured at fair value in the consolidated
financial statements, and secondly enabled the entire
amount of goodwill to be written off immediately by
offset against consolidated equity. The second of these
was relatively painless, in that one condition for using
the pooling of interests method was that the bulk of
the acquisition price had to be paid by the issuance of
new shares, which would already have had the effect
of increasing the acquiror’s equity. This approach has
been used in France since 1995.
From now on, US GAAP require all acquisitions to
be accounted for using the purchase accounting
method. This requires the revaluation in the
consolidated financial statements of all the assets
and liabilities of the acquiree as of the date of its
first inclusion in the consolidation, and prohibits the
offset of goodwill against equity. This means that
the acquisition cost will be allocated first to justified
revaluations of the acquiree’s assets and liabilities.
The more unrealised gains on assets and liabilities
are identified, the lower will be the amount of
goodwill.
However, these rules do not apply to acquisitions
made before 1 July 2001, many of which were
accounted for using the pooling of interests method.
At the same time, FAS 142, applicable to accounting
periods starting on or after 15 December 2001,
prohibits amortisation of goodwill and intangibles
with an indefinite useful life 29.
29 Previously, these assets were amortised over a period not exceeding forty years.150  Banque de France • FSR • June 2003
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Instead, these assets are subject to a regular
impairment review, at least once a year. The
benchmark used in determining whether
impairment has occurred is fair value.
The IASB plans 30 to follow the new US standards closely
by prohibiting firstly the use of the pooling of interests
method for the first-time consolidation of
recently-acquired companies, and secondly the
amortisation of goodwill. In addition, impairment
tests based on fair value would have to be performed
systematically for assets with an indefinite useful
life. This draft is set to be finalised into a definitive
standard during 2003, which would then apply to
listed European companies from 1 January 2005.
5|2 Negative consequences
in a context of subdued
economic activity…
In the United States, in the present climate of sharply
falling share prices and corporate profit warnings, the
introduction of these new rules has led to very large goodwill
impairment losses, especially on companies acquired in
the technology, media and telecoms (TMT) sector.
Impairment test valuation methods that are based on
fair value, which is supposedly reflected in the stock
market value of the company if it is listed, leave
management with little discretion in determining
valuations. The situation has been exacerbated by recent
events which have left financial statement users and
public opinion deeply sceptical, thereby forcing
company bosses to be highly cautious in their evaluation
of performances. For example, AOL-Time Warner has
just announced a record loss of 100 billion dollars, mainly
due to goodwill impairment losses.
There is a risk of this phenomenon spreading to Europe,
where the possibility of writing down goodwill for
impairment has existed for a long time but has rarely
been used, on the grounds that even if the market value
of acquiree companies fell, their value in use would
still exceed acquisition cost.
The growing requirement for transparency and the
ever-increasing use of market values as benchmarks
could force European groups to adjust the value of
their investments in controlled companies to market
value on a more systematic basis. Against the current
backdrop of subdued economic activity and persistent
weakness on the stock markets, this could generate
substantial provisions for impairment of goodwill.
That said, mergers and acquisitions have almost
certainly been fewer in number, and in any event
smaller, in Europe than in the United States. This
may limit the amount of goodwill liable to be
impaired. For example, a comparison of the banking
sector shows that French banks generally have lower
exposure to the risk of goodwill impairment losses,
in proportion to both equity and annual profits 31.
On the other hand, abolition of the pooling of
interests method and the requirement to carry out
impairment tests on goodwill might in future be an
obstacle to the restructuring transactions which may
be needed to achieve greater integration of the
European economy.
Goodwill impairment is the most pressing and
spectacular manifestation of the changes in the
accounting rules for business combinations. But other
effects will feed through in the longer term, such as the
disappearance of the annual goodwill amortisation
charge, which will be a generally positive factor in terms
of reported earnings. On the downside, the obligation to
revalue the assets and liabilities of acquiree companies
on first–time consolidation will reduce the ability of
groups to realise capital gains on future disposals of such
assets and liabilities, and will require them to book higher
depreciation charges, or even impairment losses, on the
revalued assets. Both these points will depress future
reported earnings. It is at present very difficult to assess
the overall impact of the contradictory effects brought
about by these changes.
5|3 … but a fairly positive
assessment in terms
of prudence and volatility
The requirement to revalue an acquiree’s assets and
liabilities usually increases its net assets, and hence its
equity, by an amount equivalent to the unrealised gains
recognised as a result of the revaluation. The residual
portion of the acquisition price, treated as goodwill, is
reduced by the same amount, but only the goodwill is
deducted from equity. This means that the purchase
accounting method gives a higher equity figure than
the pooling of interests method, the excess being the
amount by which the assets are revalued. However,
these revaluations relate to assets for which there is
not necessarily an active market, or which a bank
wishes (or indeed is obliged) to retain for the
purposes of its business. These unrealised gains are
hence in reality not available – unlike equity, which
30 Phase I of the project on business combinations, which resulted in the publication of an exposure draft in December 2002.
31 The unamortised goodwill of France's principal banks represents around 15% of their equity and one year's profits, compared with 20%-33%
and 2-5 years respectively for comparable international banks.Banque de France • FSR • June 2003 151
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6| Systematic recognition of obligations to employees
6|1 The proposed treatment
is a substantial change
to current practice
In the area of obligations to employees, IAS 19
on employee benefits and the exposure draft
on share-based payment, published on
7 November 2002, represent a substantial change to
current practice not only in Europe but also, in the
case of share-based payment, in the United States.
At present, recognition of employee benefit
obligations is merely optional in most national
accounting standards. The need for tighter regulation
of accounting for such obligations has begun to be
felt at international level, especially with the
proliferation of share-based payment in Europe and
the United States. Nearly 10 million Americans own
stock options, which have become a significant form
of non-salary remuneration: stock options now
account for half of total senior management
is intended to be available to cover the risks to which
the bank is exposed. This new rule could therefore
impair the quality of bank equity.
On the other hand, the systematic application of
goodwill impairment tests is a positive development
in terms of prudence. Moreover, defining more
precise rules for these tests reduces the scope for
subjective assessments by management,
encouraging more consistent and comparable
valuations. However, the priority given to market
values to carry out these tests could result in the
sidelining of strategic factors and of the long-term
view of acquisitions. This could create additional
volatility compared with the current situation, and
extends the use of fair value accounting with no
reference to management intent or corporate
strategies. Moreover, in a period of economic
slowdown and/or increasing risk, recognition of
goodwill impairment losses in the balance sheet and
income statement could have a cumulative effect,
accentuating the effect of the cycle itself. This
phenomenon is particularly significant in that it
comes after a period of expansion which encouraged
high acquisition prices.
But the real challenge of this accounting reform is
whether it can provide a fairer representation of the
true cost of acquiring a company. The pooling of
interests method should in theory have been limited
to the relatively few cases of mergers between equals,
where the parties voluntarily pooled their efforts and
resources on an equal footing and continued to trade
as before. However, the method has sometimes been
abused, especially in the United States (a frequently-cited
case study being a pooling of interests between an
auto dealership and General Motors).
More generally, the painless (or even favourable)
accounting treatment associated with the pooling
of interests method has encouraged imprudence
among company managers in determining the true
cost of acquiring a business. Any overpayment would
be hidden away in goodwill, and hence could be
discreetly eliminated by immediate offset against
equity without denting reported net income. Assets
that had not been revalued could later be sold and
the resulting gains taken to net income, even though
these gains had largely been paid for as part of the
acquisition price, thereby giving an illusion of
creating shareholder value.
Ultimately, it has been the acquiror’s shareholders
who have been penalised by being heavily diluted,
often without realising it. Companies which played
a big part in fuelling the TMT bubble used pooling
of interests on a massive scale. It is therefore to be
hoped that abolishing this accounting method will help
clean up corporate acquisition practices. Buyers will
thereby be encouraged to offer realistic prices, which
should in turn lead to more stable markets.
remuneration in the United States. The extent of
pension obligations varies from company to
company. For example, the large automobile groups
which have committed to defined-benefit schemes
are facing problems with the recapitalisation of their
pension funds, involving very substantial sums of
money. The aim therefore is to increase financial
transparency as regards a company’s obligations, and
thereby to restore investor confidence.
Existing rules on stock options are basically confined
to US and Canadian standards, and usually give a
very low valuation of such obligations. Draft
standards are in issue in Germany and Denmark,
pending international developments. In France,
there is as yet no specific rule, and options to
subscribe for shares are treated as capital increases
and recognised when the option is exercised. In the
case of options to buy shares, a provision is booked
if it is probable that the company will incur an
expense when the option is exercised.152  Banque de France • FSR • June 2003
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The exposure draft on share–based payment published
in November 2002 by the IASB represents a radical
change, in that it requires, with no exceptions, that an
expense be recognised for all payments made in shares
or equity instruments to any counterparty. Consequently,
all such transactions must be recognised at fair value in
the financial statements on the grant date.
By comparison, for transactions with employees,
US standards impose a minimum requirement that
an expense be recognised equivalent to the intrinsic
value of the options granted, with fair value allowed
as an optional treatment. However, fair value will
generally result in the recognition of a much higher
expense than intrinsic value, because it takes into
account the time value of money.
Recognition of pension obligations would become
compulsory  32, and businesses which, formally or
through established custom,  grant their employees
benefits that are not immediate consideration for
services rendered (lump-sum retirement benefits,
top-up pensions) must identify each plan, determine
the plan type (defined-contribution/defined-benefit 33)
and assess whether the obligation is sufficiently
material to require valuation.
6|2 The IASB seems to have opted
for prudence
and transparency…
The decision to opt for compulsory recognition of all
employee benefits seems to have been driven by a
concern for transparency. It is after all important for
published information to reflect all obligations to
which a company has committed, and to avoid the
risk that expense arising under existing obligations
may be deferred to future periods. The main
disclosure requirement for share-based payment is
a description of the transactions during the period,
of the methods used to determine the fair value of
the goods and services received and the instruments
granted, and of the income statement impact of each
type of transaction. In the case of pension
obligations, disclosure requirements include a
general description of the type of scheme, the fund
assets, the main actuarial assumptions, etc. The aim
is therefore to improve the comparability of different
companies’ obligations, and to achieve greater
transparency in financial information.
32 At present, this is a preferred option under French GAAP.
33 In the first case, the company simply recognises its annual contribution. In the second case, the company may be forced to record a provision if
the assets allocated to the scheme are insufficient relative to the company's cumulative obligations.
6|3 … but the consequences
are difficult to assess
and could create volatility
in company accounts
It is difficult to assess the consequences of these
reforms at this point. However, they are likely to be
significant, and to have an impact on the balance
sheets and income statements of companies which
did not previously recognise pension obligations or
stock options.
The recognition of provisions for pension obligations to
employees is likely to seriously penalise credit
institutions, which still have obligations under the former
special regimes set up prior to 1993. It is also very
probable that these reforms will be unhelpful for
public-sector undertakings which operate special
pension schemes. In general, the requirement to
book provisions penalises companies operating
defined-benefit plans rather than those operating
defined-contribution plans. In the latter case, the
expense can be predicted, and is not subject to
revision. The decision to adopt this accounting
treatment is not a neutral one at a time when there
is widespread debate on the future of pension
systems and when the slump in the financial markets
has exposed the inherent risk of funded pension
schemes, which often operate as a means of hedging
a company’s benefit obligations. There is also a risk
that these rules may have a similar effect on early
retirement plans granted by companies. IAS 19 could
therefore prejudice financial or technical decisions
on pension schemes. A major shift is already taking
place in the United Kingdom, with companies
switching to defined-contribution plans.
Turning to stock options, the requirement to recognise
expense risks penalising companies which are keen
to develop this form of payment in order to reduce
headline payroll costs. This rule also penalises
expanding companies, who are forced to
refinance because the new rule has the effect of
reducing reported earnings per share and diluting
existing shares.
However, despite the highly predictable negative effects
of implementing these standards, they should enable
financial statement users to identify all the obligations
entered into by a company, thereby contributing to
greater prudence and transparency.Banque de France • FSR • June 2003 153
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All in all, the issues addressed in this article illustrate the importance of these new standards not
only for the accounting presentation of the activities of listed companies, but also, crucially, for the
day-to-day management of these companies, especially in terms of re-engineering their information
systems. There are many positive aspects to these changes, including the intended improvement in
international comparability and an end to the use of different accounting standards in each financial
market.
However, proper account needs to be taken of the impact of these new rules on financial stability. In
particular, the fairly systematic use of market valuations is open to question if prudence is seen as
the guiding principle. The volatility which these changes might create in financial statements raises
questions about the extent to which some of these proposals risk generating undue complexity in the
way businesses are managed. And finally, the systematic use of market valuations could accentuate
financial cycles and affect the working of the economy.
Central banks, and all other authorities with an interest in financial stability, need to be very closely
involved in the revision process for these accounting standards, bringing critical analysis to bear on
them in order to contribute to the development of satisfactory standards at international level. This
reform is an opportunity to improve financial statement transparency, thereby enhancing the efficiency
of our financial markets. All the more reason, therefore, for the reform to be properly carried out.